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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeremy Hathaway timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Hathaway argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him 
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various 
transcripts he requested be added to the record on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Hathaway 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his oral Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hathaway was charged with aiding and abetting burglary. (R., pp.60-61.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to an amended charge of attempted 
burglary and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss a misdemeanor charge of minor in 
possession of alcohol. (05/06/08 Tr., p.4, L.7 - p.5, L.10; R., pp.66-74.) Thereafter, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with one year and six months 
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Hathaway on probation. (R., pp.94-
97.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for revocation of probation. 
(R., pp.123-124.) Mr. Hathaway admitted to violating the terms of his probation by 
violating the law, changing residence without permission, submitting untruthful written 
reports, failing to seek employment, possessing or consuming a controlled substance, 
failing to submit to testing for controlled substances or alcohol, and failing to adhere to 
instructions provided by his probation officer. (R., pp.155-156.) Thereafter, the district 
court revoked probation, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.160-161.) Upon review of 
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Mr. Hathaway's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.170-172.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a motion for revocation of 
probation. (R., pp.177-179.) Mr. Hathaway admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation by changing his residence without permission, failing to obtain employment, 
failing to complete treatment ordered by his probation officer, and failing to pay court 
ordered fees. (R., pp.180-183, 196-197.) The district court revoked probation, but then 
reinstated probation. (R., pp.198-199.) 
After a third period of probation, the State again filed a motion for revocation of 
probation. (R., pp.202-203.) Mr. Hathaway admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation by failing to pay court ordered fees, failing to appear for a court hearing, and 
committing misdemeanor crimes of domestic battery and malicious injury to property. 
(R., pp.205-207, 222; 04/20/12 Tr., p.9, L.18 - p.10, L.6.) At the final disposition 
hearing, Mr. Hathaway made an oral request for a sentence reduction, which was 
denied by the district court. (04/20/12 Tr., p.16, Ls.16-22, p.18, Ls.3-10.) The district 
court then revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.234-235.) 
Mr. Hathaway timely appealed. (R., pp.237-239.) 
Mr. Hathaway filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by 
the district court. 1 (R., pp.232-233, 246-248.) 
On appeal, Mr. Hathaway filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected to Mr. Hathaway's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
1 Mr. Hathaway is not challenging the denial of his written Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying 
his request for transcripts of the evidentiary hearing held on April 16, 2010, the 
disposition hearing held on May 7, 2010, and the evidentiary hearing held on November 
5, 2011, and the disposition hearing held on April 15, 201'1. (Order Denying Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to 
Augment), pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hathaway due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for 
review of the issues on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hathaway's oral Rule 
35 motion requesting leniency? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hathaway Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Hathaway filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of 
the evidentiary hearing held on April 16, 2010, the disposition hearing held on May 7, 
2010, the evidentiary hearing held on November 5, 2011, and the disposition hearing 
held on April 15, 2011, that request was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, 
Mr. Hathaway is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the 
transcripts. Mr. Hathaway asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the 
issue of whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Hathaway's 
oral Rule 35 motion because the applicable standard of review requires an appellate 
court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to 
evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court 
erred in denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hathaway Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The Issues On Appeal 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hathaway With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. 
art.I§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). Const. 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Cabal/era, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. 
See I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a 
relevant transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I. C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
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before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an 
order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order 
pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the 
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, 
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
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sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable 
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that 
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. 1/Vashington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its statement in 
Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the stenographic 
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. 
at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the 
defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The Court ultimately 
concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be adequately reviewed 
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
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prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If a review 
of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts it becomes the 
State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary for the appeal. 
Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. The 
requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all 
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. "When we review a sentence that is ordered 
into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record 
encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon 
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between 
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other words, an appellate court reviewing 
a district court's sentencing decision conducts an independent review of the entire 
record to determine if the record supports the district court's decisions. This standard of 
review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required to state their sentencing 
rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984). 
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An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 
(Ct. App. 1985)). If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, that 
may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is possible, then 
transcripts are not necessary for appellate review, even though the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed) that appellate counsel not rely on the district court 
minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 
Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Hathaway fails to provide the appellate court with 
transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Hathaway's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action 
alone which prevents him from access to the necessary items, then such action is a 
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of a revocation of 
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probation order. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. After he completed his rider, the district court placed the 
defendant on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant 
appealed from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-621. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not 
necessary for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second 
probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. 
The Court of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. 
Specifically it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis). 
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Morgan is distinguishable because Morgan was challenging the order revoking 
probation and Mr. Hathaway is challenging the length of his sentence, which entails an 
analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 
judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed 
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of 
probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the 
2 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process because it does not have the power to overrule 
a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on to state 
that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed 
with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and 
contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules 
require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
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requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation 
revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the 
issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is not 
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal 
is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official 
position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the 
trial); State v. Wa!face, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon 
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not 
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from 
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to revoke probation. 
The rationale behind this position perfect sense in light of State v. Adams 
115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of Appeals explained why 
the appellate courts should look to the entire record when reviewing the executed 
sentence: 
(emphasis added). Mr. Hathaway is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to 
file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110 expressly 
prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could 
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
14 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
As such, when an appellate files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation 
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
comprehensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to, as well as, the events 
which occurred during the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this 
standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. The 
Court of Appeals then stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider 
the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must 
expressly reference the prejudgment events at the probation disposition hearing in order 
for this standard of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
assumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when 
determining whether probation should be revoked. Whether the prior hearings were 
transcribed or not is irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume that the district court 
15 
will remember the events from the prior proceedings when it ultimately revokes 
probation. 
In this case, the Honorable Susan E. Wiebe presided over the final disposition 
hearing held on June 1, 2012. (R., p.235.) The Honorable Susan E. Wiebe also 
presided over the evidentiary hearing held on April 16, 2010, the disposition hearing 
held on May 7, 2010, and the evidentiary hearing held on November 5, 2011, and the 
disposition hearing held on April 15, 2011, the transcripts of which were requested in 
the Motion to Augment. (R., pp.155-156, 158-159, 168-169, 196-197.) As such, the 
Adams opinion indicates that an appellate court will presume the district court relied on 
its memory of those proceedings when it revoked probation. Therefore, transcripts of 
those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to review the merits of his 
sentencing claim. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
a merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal because the applicable standard of review of the denial of a Rule 35 motion 
requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all of the proceedings 
before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not on the district 
court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on appeal is if the 
record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the 
decision to deny Mr. Hathaway's request for the transcripts will render his appeal 
meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the district 
court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of 
Mr. Hathaway's appellate sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, he should 
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either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be 
applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hathaway With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court 
recognized a due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According 
to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 7 44 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
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an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Hathaway has not 
obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to deny his oral Rule 35 motion. Further, counsel is unable to advise 
Mr. Hathaway on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Hathaway is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Hathaway his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include a right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
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provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hathaway's Oral Rule 35 
Motion Requesting Leniency 
Mr. Hathaway asserts that the unified sentence of four years, with one year and 
six months fixed, is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors 
present in this matter. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is 
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for 
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed is unduly severe. 
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). 'The criteria for examining rulings 
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether 
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Hathaway does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Hathaway must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
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was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under 
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Mr. Hathaway's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Hathaway 
earned his GED. (2008 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.5.) He 
suffers from depression and has had suicidal ideations in the past. (2008 PSI, pp.5-6.) 
While on his rider, Mr. Hathaway "did very well and worked on various work crews." 
(Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), pp.2-3.) He 
got along with staff and other inmates. (APSI, p.3.) "He became a positive role model 
and a good community member." (APSI p.3.) Ultimately, he earned a probation 
recommendation from the Department of Correction. (APSI, p.3.) 
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Hathaway's oral 
Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hathaway respectfully requests the requested transcripts necessary for a 
merits-based review of his sentencing claim be augmented into the record on appeal. 
In the event this request is denied, Mr. Hathaway respectfully requests that this Court 
reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Hathaway requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2013. 
I 
I / 
SHAWN F. WILKEF<SON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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